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Source: BC RCMP available at http://bc.rcmp-grc.gc.ca
“They Are Our Heroes. 
We Shall Not Forget Them.”
inscription on Canada’s Police and Peace Officers’ Memorial, Ottawa
On November 13, 2012 28-year-old Royal Canadian 
Mounted Police Constable Adrian Oliver was killed in an 
automobile collision in Surrey, British Columbia at 
approximately 5:00 am. He was driving  an unmarked 
police car and returning  back to the detachment when he 
was involved in a collision with a large transport truck.
Emergency responders attended and tried to remove Cst. 
Oliver from his car and provide medical assistance. Despite 
their efforts Cst. Oliver passed away. The driver of the truck 
was not injured.
Cst. Oliver was born in British Columbia and was a second 
generation Mountie, with his dad currently serving  in 
Ottawa and his brother also a member of the RCMP serving 
in the Lower Mainland.
Cst. Oliver was a valued member of 
“C” Watch at Surrey Detachment and 
had served his entire 3 ½ year career 
in Surrey. He was an outstanding 
police officer, with a great attitude 
and commitment to serve others.
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advice. The opinions expressed herein are not 
necessarily the opinions of the Justice Institute 
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www.10-8.ca 
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POLICE LEADERSHIP 
APRIL 7-9, 2013
Coming soon! ! ! The Br i t i sh 
Columbia Association of Chiefs of 
Police, the Ministry of Public Safety 
and Solicitor General, and the 
Justice Institute of British Columbia 
Police Academy are hosting the 
Police Leadership 2013 Conference 
in Vancouver, British Columbia. This is Canada’s 
largest police leadership conference and will 
provide an opportunity for delegates to discuss 
leadership topics presented by world renowned 
speakers.
“The Service of Policing: 
Meeting Public Expectations”
www.policeleadershipconference.com
see 
pages 
30-31
see pages 28-29
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WHAT’S NEW FOR POLICE IN 
THE LIBRARY
The Justice Institute of British Columbia Library is an 
excellent resource for learning. Here is a list of its 
most recent acquisitions which may be of interest to 
police. 
The 22 immutable laws of branding: how to build 
a product or service into a world-class brand.
Al Ries and Laura Ries.
New York, NY: HarperBusiness, c2002.
HD 69 B7 R537 2002
The anxiety & phobia workbook.
Edmund J. Bourne.
Oakland, CA: New Harbinger Publications, c2010.
RC 531 B67 2010
Appreciative inquiry in higher education:  a 
transformative force.
Jeanie Cockell, Joan McArthur-Blair.
San Francisco, CA: Jossey-Bass, 2012.
LC 1100 C63 2012
The art of teaching  [videorecording]: best practices 
from a master educator.
Patrick N. Allitt.
Chantilly, VA: Teaching Co., c2010.
4 videodiscs (ca. 720 min.) :  sd.,  col.  ; 4 3/4 in. + 1 course 
guidebook (xvi, 81 p. ; 19 cm.)
Course guidebook includes professor biographies, 
statement of course scope, lecture outlines and 
notes, glossary and bibliography. Teaching  is more 
than a job-- it's a responsibility, one of the greatest 
responsibilities in civilized society. Teachers lay bare 
the mysteries of the world; train minds to explore, 
question, investigate, and discover; and ensure that 
knowledge is not lost or forgotten but passed on to 
future generations. Teachers shape lives in limitless 
ways, both inside and outside of the classroom. But 
teaching  is no easy task. It's an art form that requires 
craft, sensitivity, creativity, and intelligence.  
Whether the classroom consists of 3 students or 300, 
it's important to be as effective and successful a 
teacher as possible, both for the students and for 
professional and personal growth.  This program is 
designed to help develop and enhance teaching 
style; provide methods, tools, and advice for  
handling  all manner of teaching  scenarios; and help 
viewers achieve new levels of success as teachers.
LB 1025.3 A46 2010 D1494
Best laid  plans: the tyranny of unintended 
consequences and how to avoid them.
William A. Sherden.
Santa Barbara, CA: Praeger, c2011.
BF 448 S44 2011
Boundless potential:  transform your brain, 
unleash  your talents, reinvent your work in 
midlife and beyond.
Mark Walton.
New York, NY: McGraw-Hill, c2012.
BF 724.65 M53 W35 2012
Combining  e-learning  and m-learning: new 
applications of blended educational resources.
[edited by] David Parsons.
Hershey, PA: Information Science Reference, c2011.
LB 1044.84 C56 2011
Elements of crisis intervention: crises and how to 
respond to them.
James L. Greenstone, Sharon C. Leviton.
Belmont, CA: Brooks-Cole, c2011.
RC 480.6 G719 2011
Facilitating  with ease!:  core skills for facilitators, 
team leaders and members , managers , 
consultants, and trainers.
Ingrid Bens.
San Francisco, CA: Jossey-Bass, c2012.
HD 66 B445 2012
How Canadians govern themselves.
Eugene A. Forsey.
Ottawa, ON: Library of Parliament, 2012.
JL 65 F67 2012
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Lead  by greatness:  how character can power your 
success.
David Lapin.
[US]: Avoda Books, c2012.
HD 57.7 L375 2012
The leadership challenge:  how to make 
extraordinary things happen in organizations.
James M. Kouzes, Barry Z. Posner.
San Francisco, CA: Jossey-Bass, c2012.
HD 57.7 K68 2012
Lean  but agile:  rethink workforce planning and 
gain a true competitive edge.
William J. Rothwell, James Graber, Neil McCormick.
New York, NY: American Management Association, 
2012.
HF 5549.5 M3 R662 2012
Managing  for people who hate managing: be a 
success by being yourself.
by Devora Zack ; i l lus t ra t ions by Jeevan 
Sivasubramaniam.
San Francisco, CA: Berrett-Koehler, c2012.
HD 38.2 Z335 2012
Managing stress : emotion and power at work.
Tim Newton with Jocelyn Handy and Stephen 
Fineman.
London; Thousand Oaks: Sage Publications, 1995.
BF 575 S75 N48 1995
More jolts!:  50 activities to wake up and engage 
your participants.
Sivasailam "Thiagi" Thiagarajan and Tracy Tagliati.
San Francisco, CA: Pfeiffer, c2012.
HD 30.26 T487 2012
Personality style at work: the secret to working 
with (almost) anyone.
Kate Ward.
New York, NY: McGraw-Hill, c2012.
BF 698.9 O3 W37 2012
Practical research: planning and design.
Paul D. Leedy, Jeanne Ellis Ormrod.
Boston, MA: Pearson, [2012], c2013.
Q 180.55 M4 L43 2012
Trauma, psychopathology, and violence: causes, 
consequences, or correlates? 
edited by Cathy Spatz Widom.
New York, NY: Oxford University Press, c2012.
RC 552 P67 T73 2012
The trustworthy leader: leveraging  the power of 
trust to transform your organization.
Amy Lyman.
San Francisco, CA: Jossey-Bass, c2012.
HD 57.7 L94 2012  
JIBC POLICE ACADEMY 
APPOINTS NEW DIRECTOR
Mr. Steve Schnitzer has 
accepted the position of 
Director, Police Academy, 
effective November 5, 
2012.  Steve has been the 
Interim Director in the 
Police Academy since 
February 2012. He joined 
the JIBC as a Program 
Director in the Justice & 
Public Safety Division in 
September 2010 after 
retiring  from a 30 year career with the Vancouver 
Police Department. 
In the Vancouver Police Department Steve had a 
varied career where operationally he had significant 
expertise in major event planning  and public order 
events. As a result of his expertise he was designated 
the Venue Commander for BC Place Stadium and 
Canada Hockey Place during  the 2010 Olympic and 
Paralympic Games. Steve ended his career with the 
Vancouver Police Department as the Superintendent 
in charge of Personnel Services, which oversaw 
Human Resources, Professional Standards, and 
Recruiting and Training. 
 
Steve earned a Masters degree in Leadership and 
Training  at Royal Roads University in 2007 and 
brings significant leadership experience, knowledge 
and skills to this role.
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SEEING THE RISK & TAKING THE 
CHANCE IMPARTS KNOWLEDGE
R. v. Schepannek, 2012 BCCA 368
The accused was visi t ing  her 
common law inmate husband at a 
provincial correctional facility. 
During  the visit she passed her 
husband a package which was later 
found to contain hashish and marihuana, as well as 
tobacco. A video taken from surveillance cameras at 
the visiting  area captured her making  the delivery. 
She took the package from her underwear and 
passed it over the partition to her husband. He then 
hid it on his person. The accused was charged with 
trafficking in hashish and marihuana.
 
British Columbia Provincial Court
 
The accused admitted she passed her 
husband the package, but denied 
knowing  it contained drugs. She said her 
husband telephoned her, said he was in 
trouble and needed her help by bringing  tobacco to 
him on a future visit to the correctional facility. She 
testified she knew it was against the facility’s rules 
because tobacco is considered contraband. 
Nevertheless, she agreed to meet a man, who she 
did not know nor had ever met or seen before, in the 
parking  lot of a community school. He passed her a 
sock and said, “Give this to Jimmy”. The meeting 
was brief and nothing  else was said. The accused 
took the package home, removed it from the sock, 
threw the sock away and left the plastic package on 
top of her fridge unopened. She claimed she did not 
know the package contained drugs, and thought it 
was tobacco. 
The accused suggested she had an honest, but 
mistaken belief and therefore the mens rea of 
possession had not been proven beyond a 
reasonable doubt. The judge found the Crown had 
not proven actual knowledge beyond a reasonable 
doubt but had established recklessness—the conduct 
of one who sees the risk but takes the chance. She 
was reckless as to the nature of the substance in the 
package and this was so at all material times after it 
came into her possession. She was convicted of 
trafficking in both hashish and marihuana.
British Columbia Court of Appeal
 
The accused argued, among  other 
grounds, that the trial judge erred 
in treating  recklessness (mens rea) 
as establishing  that she had legal 
knowledge that illicit drugs were in the package.
 
Recklessness
 
The test for recklessness, as described by the 
Supreme Court of Canada in R. v. Sansregret (1985), 
18 C.C.C. (3d) 233 (S.C.C.), is:
 
It is found in the attitude of one who, aware that 
there is danger and that his conduct could bring 
about the result prohibited by the common law, 
nevertheless persists, despite the risk. It is, in 
other words, the conduct of one who sees the 
risk and who takes the chance. It is in this sense 
that the term “recklessness” is used in the 
criminal law ... The culpability in recklessness is 
justified by consciousness of the risk and by 
proceeding in the face of it, while in wilful 
blindness it is justified by the accused's fault in 
deliberately failing  to inquire when he knows 
there is reason for inquiry.
The Court of Appeal found there was sufficient 
evidence upon which the judge could conclude 
knowledge had been proven. The judge could infer 
recklessness from the nature of the husband’s 
request, and the unusual meeting  and hand-off of a 
package in a sock said to contain a substance 
represented to be simply tobacco, a product readily 
available in commercial establishments. Plus, the 
accused’s own testimony was that she knew the 
package could contain cocaine or a weapon and she 
“decided not to look inside”. The accused’s appeal 
was dismissed.
Complete case available at www.courts.gov.bc.ca
Sidebar: To establish mens rea, or the knowledge 
element of the possession offence, the Crown was 
required to prove that the accused had legal 
knowledge that illicit drugs were in the package. 
This could be established by proving either:
1. Actual knowledge;
2. Recklessness — seeing  the risk and taking  the 
chance;  or
Volume 12 Issue 6 - November/December 2012
PAGE 6
3. Wilful blindness — becoming  aware of the 
need for some inquiry but declining  to make 
the inquiry because a person does not wish to 
know the truth. 
POSSESSION PROVEN DESPITE 
DRUG’s REMOVAL
R. v. Wall, 2012 NLCA 67
 
The accused went to a vacant 
apartment rented by his cousin 
where he received delivery of a 
package addressed to “J. Wahl”. The 
package was delivered by an RCMP 
officer dressed in a Canada Post uniform. The 
package had been earlier intercepted by authorities 
and found to contain 7 ½ pounds of marihuana. The 
marihuana had been removed before the package 
was delivered and was replaced with lawn grass. 
Shortly after delivery was accepted, the police 
entered the house and found the accused alone. The 
package was open and its contents were found on 
the ground outside a window of the house. The 
accused was charged with trafficking  and possessing 
marihuana for the purpose of trafficking (PPT).
 
Newfoundland Provincial Court
 
The accused testified he was 
in the apartment to do some 
repairs so that his cousin 
could get the security deposit 
back. He said he had no knowledge of 
the package and its marihuana content. 
The accused’s cousin did not testify, but 
the landlord did, stating  he did not know 
the accused,  had not given him permission to be in 
the house and was unaware that anything  needed to 
be fixed for return of the security deposit. The trial 
judge disbelieved the accused’s testimony and found 
he "had no legitimate business being  at this 
particular address" and it "would be an astronomical 
coincidence, it would be a coincidence beyond any 
reasonable or rational belief whatsoever that he 
could be there and that package was delivered at 
that particular point in time". The judge inferred the 
accused made arrangements to receive the package 
and accepted it believing  it contained drugs. The 
accused was convicted of both offences and 
sentenced to two 12-month concurrent conditional 
sentences.
 
Newfoundland Court of Appeal
 
The accused argued, among  other 
things, that possession of the drugs 
had not been made out at law 
since he received a package 
containing  no marihuana. The Crown conceded the 
conviction for trafficking  was unreasonable, it was 
set aside, along  with the sentence, and an acquittal 
was entered. As for the PPT count, “possession” was 
a necessary element. The Court of Appeal noted that 
in some parts of Canada the police practice is to 
remove all of the drugs from an intercepted 
shipment while in other parts of Canada the practice 
is to remove almost all of the drugs, but leave a 
small amount in order to meet the requirement for 
“possession”.
 
In this case, the accused never had personal 
possession of the marihuana—it had been removed 
from the package. However, possession can also be 
proven constructively or jointly. “For constructive 
possession, two elements are required: the accused 
must have knowledge and ‘some 
measure of control over the item 
to be possessed’," said Justice 
Rowe speaking  for the Court of 
Appeal. “For joint possession, 
three elements are required: 
‘knowledge, consent and a 
measure of control on the part of 
the person deemed to be in 
p o s s e s s i o n ’ . " H e r e , t h e 
requirements for joint possession by the accused 
were made out because the requisite knowledge, 
consent and control could be inferred. He accepted 
delivery of the package believing  it contained drugs 
and opened it. The appeal on the PPT conviction 
was dismissed. As for the sentence, it remained 
intact since the penalties imposed ran concurrently. 
Complete case available at www.canlii.org
Sidebar: The Court in Wall referred to its earlier 
ruling  of R. v. Bonassin, 2008  NLCA 40. Bonassin 
was convicted of possessing  cocaine and marijuana 
for the purpose of trafficking. As in Wall, the police 
“For joint possession, 
three elements are 
required: ‘knowledge, 
consent and a measure of 
control on the part of the 
person deemed to be in 
possession’.”
Volume 12 Issue 6 - November/December 2012
PAGE 7
in Bonassin intercepted a parcel (this time a 
computer), removed the drugs and had the package 
delivered containing  an equivalent weight in books. 
The trial judge concluded that Bonassin intended to 
take the parcel which he believed contained 
drugs.  On appeal, two judges agreed that the 
accused was guilty of joint possession because he 
entered into an agreement with another person 
regarding  the drugs before they were removed by the 
police. In upholding  the convictions, the majority 
noted that there are generally three components of 
possession:
1. knowledge of the item,
2. intention or consent to have possession of 
the item, and
3. control over the item.
 
In the majority’s view, it was not necessary that 
Bonassin take actual possession of the drugs.  
Instead, the three elements of knowledge, consent, 
and control were established. 
“By permitting  delivery of the ‘fake’ parcel, the 
police identified Bonassin as a participant in the 
trafficking  scheme,” said Justice Welsh.  “Joint 
possession of the drugs by Bonassin at the relevant 
time, that is, prior to seizure of the parcel by the 
police, was proved beyond a reasonable doubt, and 
convictions were properly entered.” Bonassin and 
the sender had knowledge of the drugs, intended or 
consented to have possession of them and had 
control over them until they were seized by the 
police. 
Justice Rowe disagreed, finding  there was no 
evidence that the accused exerted “control” over the 
drugs and therefore joint or constructive possession 
had not been proven. Instead he would have found 
Bonassin guilty of attempted PPT because all the 
elements of PPT had been established except for the 
fact that the drugs did not come into his possession - 
they had been removed.
 
TROLLING FACEBOOK HELPS 
WITH IDENTIFICATION 
EVIDENCE
R. v. T.A.H., 2012 BCCA 427
A 16-year-old youth, in company a 
friend, was robbed of a cell phone 
and wallet by three young  males. 
During  the altercation the victim felt 
one of the males looked familiar. He 
had seen him in the area a short time prior to the 
robbery and thought he had seen him before that 
date, perhaps in connection with school. Then, after 
the incident, the victim and his friend checked 
Facebook photos to find the identity of this person. 
They did find one picture that looked exactly like the 
person, discovered his name and realized he had 
earlier attended the victim’s middle school. The 
incident was reported to police. A civilian also 
turned over some of the victim’s identification to the 
police soon after the robbery. This person had seen 
three young  males going  through a wallet in a 
parking lot not long after the robbery.
British Columbia Provincial Court
The victim pointed out the accused in 
court as one of the robbers. He said that 
the accused looked familiar and he was 
sure it was him after seeing  his picture on 
Facebook. The victim’s friend also testified. He 
described the events of the robbery and said the 
Facebook process occurred two or three hours after 
the robbery. He said he was “pretty sure” the person 
whose photos were on Facebook was one of the 
robbers. The accused, on the other hand, did not 
testify. 
The trial judge concluded that the Crown had 
proven the accused’s identity beyond a reasonable 
doubt as being  involved in the robbery. Even though 
the victim and his friend did the Facebook viewing 
together, they were very cautious in giving  their 
evidence and understood the difference between 
their own personal opinion and that which was 
shared. “This identification, it is said, was much like 
a police officer giving  a witness a single photograph 
and asking, ‘Is that the man,’ some who, in a general 
www.10-8.ca
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way, matched the description,” said the judge. 
“There is some element of truth to that, in my view, 
but there is also some truth to this being  as much 
like a photo array where a witness is permitted to 
look at one photograph after another until making 
an identification. I say that because it was not 
presented to them, that is, the image, they found it, 
and then they found others.” The accused was 
convicted of robbery.
British Columbia Court of Appeal
The accused appealed, arguing 
that the process of the victim and 
his friend looking  at Facebook 
photos together rendered the 
quality of the identification unsafe to convict on or 
not properly supported by the evidence. But the 
Court of Appeal disagreed. Rather than this being  a 
case where a witness is asked to identify a stranger 
never seen by him before the offence, this was 
instead a “recognition” case. Justice Hall, speaking 
for the Court of Appeal, stated:
This was not a case where a police officer 
showing photos might have influenced a witness 
consciously or unconsciously. The two young 
men immediately after the event trolled through 
images on Facebook and recognized the 
[accused] as a person earlier known to them. 
Like the trial judge, I am satisfied that there was 
no impropriety in the methodology employed by 
the two young people. While it might have been 
a better practice to have each do the photo 
examination separately, the judge found that the 
witnesses were cautious in giving  evidence and 
each made their own decision about identity. 
[para. 11]
The trial judge did not err in his consideration of the 
evidence or that the accused’s guilt had been proven 
beyond a reasonable doubt. The judge carefully and 
appropriately analyzed the issue of identification. 
The accused’s appeal was dismissed.  
Complete case available at www.courts.gov.bc.ca
Note-able Quote
POLICE BREACH PRIVACY BY 
SEARCHING TEACHER’S WORK 
ISSUED COMPUTER
R. v. Cole, 2012 SCC 53
The accused, a high-school teacher, 
was responsible for monitoring 
student use of school networked 
laptops.  He was supplied with a 
laptop owned by the school board 
and accorded domain administration rights on the 
school’s network. This permitted him to access the 
hard drives of the students’ laptops. The use of the 
accused’s work-issued laptop was governed by the 
school board’s Policy and Procedures Manual, which 
allowed for incidental personal use. The policy 
stipulated that teachers’ email correspondence 
remained private, but was subject to access by 
school administrators if specified conditions were 
met. It did not address privacy in other types of files, 
but it did state that “all data and messages generated 
on or handled by board equipment are considered 
to be the property of [the school board].” The 
school’s Acceptable Use Policy — written for and 
signed by students — also applied mutatis mutandis 
to teachers. This policy 
not only restricted the 
use of student laptops, 
but also warned users 
not to expect privacy in 
their files. 
While performing  maintenance activities on the 
accused’s laptop, a school board technician found a 
hidden folder containing  nude and partially nude 
photographs of an underage female student. The 
technician notified the principal, who directed him 
to copy the photographs to a compact disc (CD). The 
principal seized the laptop and school technicians 
eventually gained access to it, making  a CD 
containing  the accused’s temporary Internet files, 
which contained pornographic images. The 
following  day, a police officer attended and took 
possession of the laptop and the two CDs: one CD 
contained photographs of the nude student; the 
other CD contained the accused’s temporary Internet 
files. The officer reviewed the contents of both CDs 
at the police station and then sent the laptop away 
Latin Legal Lingo
“mutatis mutandis” - 
with the necessary 
changes in points of 
detail; the gist remains 
the same.
“Leadership  and learning are indispensable to each 
other.” - John F. Kennedy 
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for forensic examination. A mirror image of the hard 
drive was created for that purpose. The accused was 
charged with possessing  child pornography and 
unauthorized use of a computer.
Ontario Court of Justice
The accused brought a pre-trial motion 
seeking  exclusion of the computer 
evidence pursuant to s. 24(2) of the 
Charter. The trial judge found that the 
accused had a reasonable expectation of privacy in 
the contents of his laptop. The warrantless search 
violated the accused’s s. 8 Charter rights and all of 
the computer evidence was excluded.
Ontario Superior Court of Justice
The Crown challenged the decision of 
the trial judge. The appeal judge found 
that the accused did not have a 
reasonable expectation of privacy and 
therefore there were no Charter breaches. The 
Crown’s appeal was allowed, the lower court’s 
decision was set aside and the matter was remitted 
back for trial.
Ontario Court of Appeal
On further appeal by the accused, 
the Ontario Court of Appeal held 
that he did have a reasonable 
expectation of privacy in the 
informational content of the laptop, but that this 
expectation was “modified to the extent that [the 
accused] knew that his employer’s technician could 
and would access the laptop as part of his role in 
maintaining  the technical integrity of the school’s 
information network”. The initial remote access by 
the technician was not a “search” for s. 8  Charter 
purposes. The search and seizure of the laptop by 
the principal and the school board (assuming  the 
Charter applied) were authorized by law and were 
reasonable. Further, the creation of the CD with the 
photographs was not unreasonable and, since the 
accused had no privacy interest in the photographs 
themselves, the search and seizure by the police of 
the this CD also did not breach s. 8. The accused, 
however, retained a  continuing  reasonable 
expectation of privacy in the laptop and the CD with 
his temporary Internet files turned over to police. Just 
because the seizure by school officials was 
reasonable, the police were not endowed with the 
same authority and the school board could not 
consent to the police search by the police. As the 
police had no other lawful authority, a s. 8  breach 
was established. The laptop and the mirror image of 
its hard drive were excluded under s. 24(2) of the 
Charter as was the CD containing  the Internet files. 
However, since the CD containing  the photographs 
should have been admissible, a new trial was 
ordered.
Supreme Court of Canada
The Crown argued again 
that the accused had no 
reasonable expectation of 
privacy in his employer-
issued laptop and therefore 
its seizure and the copying 
of its mirror image and the Internet files were not 
unreasonable. Justice Fish, speaking  for the Court on 
whether there was a Charter breach, noted that s. 8 
“guarantees the right of everyone in Canada to be 
secure against unreasonable search or seizure.  An 
inspection is a search, and a taking  is a seizure, 
where a person has a reasonable privacy interest in 
the object or subject matter of the state action and 
the information to which it gives access.” He 
continued:
Privacy is a matter of reasonable expectations.  
An expectation of privacy will attract Charter 
protection if reasonable and informed people in 
the position of the accused would expect 
privacy.
If the claimant has a reasonable expectation of 
privacy, s. 8  is engaged, and the court must then 
determine whether the search or seizure was 
reasonable.
Where, as here, a search is carried out without a 
warrant, it is presumptively unreasonable. To 
establish reasonableness, the Crown must prove 
on the balance of probabilities (1) that the search 
was authorized by law, (2) that the authorizing 
law was itself reasonable, and (3) that the 
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authority to conduct the search was exercised in 
a reasonable manner. [references omitted, paras. 
35-37]
The test for determining  whether a person has a 
reasonable expectation of privacy depends on the 
“totality of the circumstances.” This involves a four 
part inquiry: 
(1) an examination of the subject matter of the 
alleged search: The Court found the subject 
matter of the search was not the devices 
themselves but the informational content (data) 
on the laptop’s hard drive, its mirror image and 
the Internet files CD (informational privacy);
(2) a determination as to whether the claimant 
had a direct interest in the subject matter: This 
could be inferred from the accused’s use of the 
laptop to browse the Internet and store personal 
information on its hard drive;
(3) an inquiry into whether the claimant had a 
subjective expectation  of privacy in the subject 
matter: Again, the Court found this could be 
inferred from the accused's use of the laptop to 
browse the Internet and store personal 
information on its hard drive; and
(4) an assessment as to whether a subjective 
expectation of privacy was objectively 
reasonable, having  regard to the totality of the 
circumstances: Although there is no definitive 
list of factors to consider, the Court found the 
accused’s subjective expectation of privacy was 
objectively reasonable because the information 
was highly revealing  and meaningful about his 
personal life. This was so even though it 
involved a work-issued laptop and not a 
personal computer in a private residence. Just 
because the accused did not own the computer, 
which was a relevant consideration, ownership 
was not determinative. In this case, there were 
factors pulling  in opposite directions - some 
supporting  the objective reasonableness of 
privacy (the nature of the information and his 
personal use of the work-issued laptop) and 
others against (he didn't own it, policy and 
practice, and technology - the contents of his 
hard drive were available to  other users and 
technicians with domain administration rights 
when connected to the network).
On balance, Justice Fish found the accused did have 
an objectively reasonable subjective expectation of 
privacy, although it was diminished from what one 
might have in a personal computer in their home. 
More Note-able Quotes on Privacy
“Canadians may reasonably expect privacy in the 
information contained on their own personal 
computers. In my view, the same applies to 
information on work computers, at least where 
p e rs o n a l u s e i s p e r m i t te d o r re a s o n a bl y 
expected. Computers that are reasonably used 
for personal purposes —  whether found in the 
workplace or the home — contain information 
that is meaningful, intimate, and touching on the 
user’s biographical core. Vis-à-vis the state, 
everyone in Canada is constitutionally entitled 
to expect privacy in personal information of this 
kind. While workplace policies and practices 
may diminish an individual’s expectation of 
privacy in a work computer, these sorts of 
operational realities do not in themselves 
remove the expectation entirely: The nature of 
the information at stake exposes the likes, 
interests, thoughts, activities, ideas, and 
searches for information of the individual user.” 
- Justice Fish @ paras. 1-3
“The closer the subject matter of the alleged 
search lies to the biographical core of personal 
information, the more this factor will favour a 
reasonable expectation of privacy.  Put another 
way, the more personal and confidential the 
information, the more willing reasonable and 
informed Canadians will be to recognize the 
existence of a constitutionally protected privacy 
interest. Computers that are used for personal 
purposes, regardless of where they are found or 
to whom they belong, “contain the details of our 
financial, medical, and personal situations” This 
is particularly the case where, as here, the 
computer is used to browse the Web. Internet-
connected devices “reveal our specific interests, 
l i kes, and propensities, recording in the 
browsing history and cache files the information 
we seek out and read, watch, or listen to on the 
Internet”. - Justice Fish @ paras. 46-47
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Since he had a reasonable expectation of privacy in 
his Internet browsing  history and the informational 
content of his work-issued laptop, any non-
consensual examination by the police was a 
“search” and any taking was a “seizure”.
The School Search
Assuming  school officials were state agents for 
Charter purposes (a decision left for another day), 
the   principal had a statutory duty to maintain a safe 
school environment under Ontario's Education Act 
and therefore, by necessary implication, a 
reasonable power to seize and search a school-
board-issued laptop if the principal believed on 
reasonable grounds that the hard drive contained 
compromising photographs of a student.
The Police Search
The school's implied power of search and seizure, 
however, was not endowed to the police:
The police may well have been authorized to 
take physical control of the laptop and CD 
temporarily, and for the limited purpose of 
safeguarding potential evidence of a crime until 
a search warrant could be obtained. However, 
that is not what occurred here.  Quite the 
contrary: The police seized the laptop and CD in 
order to search their contents for evidence of a 
crime without the consent of [the accused], and 
without prior judicial authorization.
... ... ...
In taking possession of the computer material 
and examining its contents, the police acted 
independently of the school board. The fact that 
the school board had acquired lawful possession 
of the laptop for its own administrative purposes 
did not vest in the police a delegated or 
derivative power to appropriate and search the 
computer for the purposes of a criminal 
investigation. [references omitted, paras. 65-67]
And further:
Where a lower constitutional standard is 
applicable in an administrative context, as in this 
case, the police cannot invoke that standard to 
evade the prior judicial authorization that is 
normally required for searches or seizures in the 
context of criminal investigations. [para. 69]
In this case, the accused “throughout, retained a 
reasonable and ‘continuous’ expectation of privacy 
in the personal information on his work-issued 
laptop.” The school board was legally entitled to tell 
the police what it discovered on the laptop, but it 
did not afford the police warrantless access to the 
personal information contained within it. “This 
information remained subject, at all relevant times, 
to [the accused’s] reasonable and subsisting 
expectation of privacy,” said Justice Fish. The police, 
instead, could have obtained a warrant to search it.
Consent
The employer, as a third party, could not validly 
consent to the warrantless search or seizure of a 
laptop issued to one of its employees. “For consent 
to be valid, it must be both voluntary and informed,” 
said Justice Fish. “The adoption of a doctrine of third 
party consent in this country would imply that the 
police could interfere with an individual’s privacy 
interests on the basis of a consent that is not 
voluntarily given by the rights holder, and not 
necessarily based on sufficient information in his or 
her hands to make a meaningful choice.” The 
majority rejected the notion that the school (a third 
party) could validly consent to a search or otherwise 
waive a constitutional protection on behalf of 
another (the accused).
Admissibility - s. 24(2)
A six member majority 
admitted the evidence. 
The officer did not act 
negligently or in bad 
faith. The case law governing  privacy expectations in 
work computers was still unsettled at the time. The 
officer believed, “erroneously but understandably, 
that he had the power to search without a warrant.” 
The Charter breach was therefore not egregious or 
high on the scale of seriousness. The accused had a 
diminished, but subsisting  expectation of privacy 
and the evidence was discoverable - the police had 
reasonable grounds to obtain a warrant. Finally, the 
laptop, mirror image of its hard drive, and CD 
containing  the temporary Internet files were all 
highly reliable and probative physical evidence and 
their exclusion would have a marked negative 
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impact on the truth-seeking  function of the criminal 
trial process. The admission of the evidence would 
not bring the administration of justice into disrepute.
The Crown’s appeal was allowed, the Ontario Court 
of Appeal’s exclusionary ruling  set aside and a new 
trial was ordered.
A Lone Dissent on Admissibility
Justice Abella, although agreeing  there 
was a Charter breach, would have 
exc luded the CD conta in ing  the 
temporary Internet files and the copy of 
the hard drive. In her view, the detective had years 
of experience investigating  cyber-crime and failed to 
follow established Charter jurisprudence which 
made the breach serious. His exclusive reliance on 
ownership to determine whether a warrant was 
required was unreasonable and could not be relied 
upon to establish good faith for the purposes of s. 
24(2).
Moreover, there were no exigent circumstances or 
other legitimate reasons for police to proceed 
without a warrant. Rather, the detective had ample 
time to obtain a warrant and reasonable grounds to 
do so.  Plus, the search was highly intrusive 
regardless of whether there was a diminished 
expectation of privacy. Finally, the importance of the 
reliable evidence in this case was speculative at 
best.
Complete case available at www.scc-csc.gc.ca
R. v. Cole, 2012 SCC 53 ADMISSIBILITY/EXCLUSION GRID
                                         Court Level
Evidence Ontario 
Court of Justice
Ontario Superior 
Court of Justice
Ontario Court of 
Appeal (3:0)
Supreme Court of 
Canada  (6:1)
Laptop 
(+ mirror image of hard drive)
Excluded
(s. 24(2)
Admitted
(no breach)
Excluded
(s. 24(2)
Admitted
(s. 24(2))
CD 1
(nude photographs)
Excluded
(s. 24(2)
Admitted
(no breach)
Admitted
(no breach)
Admissibility 
not challenged
CD 2
(temporary Internet files)
Excluded
(s. 24(2)
Admitted
(no breach)
Excluded
(s. 24(2)
Admitted
(s. 24(2))
Outcome Acquitted New trial New trial New trial
“Computers that are reasonably used for personal purposes 
— whether found in the workplace or the home — contain 
information that is meaningful, intimate, and touching on the 
user’s biographical core. Vis-à-vis the state, everyone in 
Canada is constitutionally entitled to expect privacy in 
personal information of this kind.”  
Justice Fish in R. v. Cole, 2012 SCC 53 at para. 2
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STAY UPHELD FOR 
EXTRAJUDICIAL PUNISHMENT
R. v. Bellusci, 2012 SCC 44
The accused, a prisoner, was being 
transported from a courthouse to a 
penitentiary in a van driven by a 
guard. He was chained, shackled and 
handcuffed. When he became 
abusive, insulting  and crude, the guard disclosed to 
other prisoners in the van that the accused was a 
rapist, thereby placing  him in danger. The accused, 
in response, threatened to rape the guard’s wife and 
children. As the guard opened the cell door on the 
van, the accused forced the door open, injuring  the 
guard. The guard then assaulted the accused and 
injured him while he was chained, handcuffed and 
shackled in a secure cell in the van. The accused’s 
injuries included imprints of wire mesh with 
petechiae, deformation of the left forearm, and 
bumps on his head and neck. He stayed overnight 
for observation in the prison infirmary. As a result of 
the incident, the accused was 
charged with assault causing 
bodily harm, assaulting  a peace 
officer and intimidation of a justice 
system participant. 
Quebec Court
The accused was acquitted of both assault 
charges, the judge having  been left with a 
reasonable doubt about guilt. But he was 
found guilty on the intimidation charge by 
threatening  to sexually assault the guard’s wife and 
children. The judge, however, also concluded that 
the accused’s s. 7 Charter rights had been breached. 
After considering  other remedies, such as a 
reduction in sentence and the possibility of legal or 
disciplinary proceedings against the guard, a stay of 
proceedings was entered under s. 24(1). In the 
judge’s view, the prison guard had recklessly 
provoked the accused to threaten him and then, in 
response to the threats, grievously assaulted and 
unlawfully punished the accused while he was 
chained, shackled and handcuffed. The disclosure to 
the other prisoners that the accused was a sex 
offender jeopardized his personal safety while 
imprisoned. The accused’s threats, however 
reprehensible, would then likely not have been 
made but for the guard’s unjustifiable disclosure. The 
guard’s behaviour in administering  the unlawful 
extrajudicial punishment would shock the public 
and a stay of proceedings was the only appropriate 
remedy.
Quebec Court of Appeal
On Crown appeal the stay of 
proceedings was quashed and the 
matter was remitted back for trial. 
The Quebec Court of Appeal 
found the trial judge committed a reviewable error 
by overlooking  the “non sequitur” 
between the state misconduct and 
the stay of proceedings and failed 
to consider the availability of less 
drastic remedies.
Supreme Court of Canada
On the accused’s appeal, 
the Supreme Court of 
Canada reinstated the stay 
of proceedings. It found 
t h e t r i a l j u d g e h a d 
correctly identified and 
applied the proper principles of law. The accused 
was revengefully attacked by a state agent while 
chained, handcuffed, shackled and confined to his 
cell in a secure prison van. In addition, his injuries 
were not trivial. The judge was also alive to the 
difficult position of prison guards, which could not 
justify the disclosure. He was also troubled by the 
further tarnishing  of the justice system when other 
prison guards showed reticent and “sclerotic 
solidarity” in their testimony. “Having  found that [the 
accused] had been provoked and subjected by a 
state actor to intolerable physical and psychological 
abuse, it was open to the trial judge to decline to 
enter a conviction against him,” said Justice Fish, in 
delivering the unanimous seven member judgement. 
Furthermore, the trial judge did consider alternative 
remedies. He carefully and correctly considered all 
the relevant principles and, in finding  no other 
remedies appropriate, balanced the competing 
interests at play including  the difficult position of 
prison guards, the importance to the justice system 
petechiae:      
tiny purple or red 
spots on the skin 
resulting from 
hemorrhages 
under the skin's 
surface.
non sequitur:  
it does not 
follow; an 
inference or 
conclusion that 
does not follow 
from the 
premises or 
evidence
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of ensuring  their protection, the seriousness of the 
charges against the accused, the integrity of the 
justice system, and the nature and gravity of the 
Charter violation. Although Justice Fish may have 
granted a lesser remedy himself, trial judges are 
vested with a broad discretion under s. 24(1) and 
appellate intervention was unwarranted in this 
case.  As he noted, it is not the role of appellate 
courts to simply substitute their own exercise of 
discretion for that of a trial judge just because they 
would have granted a more generous or more 
limited remedy.  
Complete case available at www.scc-csc.gc.ca
‣ Possession for the purposes of trafficking. 
The police tasered an accused who was handcuffed, 
fully restrained and compliant. - R. v. Walcott (2008), 
57 C.R. (6th) 223 (Ont. S.C.J.).
‣ Driving while disqualified.  The police used 
excessive force in arresting the accused, striking his 
head several times against a vehicle, causing 
permanent injuries requiring surgery. - R. v. Maskell, 
2011 ABPC 176, 512 A.R. 372.
‣ Assaulting police and resisting arrest. Five 
police officers pepper-sprayed and kneed the 
accused several times; the accused struck his head 
on the concrete and suffered a broken jaw. The trial 
judge was also concerned that police testimony was 
untruthful. - R. v. Jackson, 2011 ONCJ 228, 235 C.R.R. 
(2d) 289.
‣ Impaired driving and dangerous driving. 
Although provoked by unruly behaviour, foul 
language, and the “resistive stance” of the accused , 
the police used excessive force in striking the 
accused while he was handcuffed and presented no 
threat. - R. v. Mohmedi, 2009 ONCJ 533, 72 C.R. (6th) 
345.
‣ Breaking and entering and possession of 
concealed weapons and housebreaking 
tools. The police used excessive force in tasering 
the accused, who was 15 years old, during a strip 
search at the police station. - R. v. J.W., 2006 ABPC 
216, 398 A.R. 374.
‣ Failing to comply with a condition of 
release (abstaining from alcohol). The police 
conducted an unreasonable strip search and tasered 
the accused despite the situation being under 
control, causing bruises, abrasions, burn marks, a 
broken tooth and bruises to the face. - R. v. R.L.F., 
2005 ABPC 28, 373 A.R. 114.
‣ Assaulting a peace officer. Despite the violent 
behaviour of the accused, the police used excessive 
force in pepper-spraying him while he was 
handcuffed and lying face down on the floor with a 
foot on his head. - R. v. Wiscombe and Tenenbein, 2003 
BCPC 418 (CanLII).
‣ Dangerous driving and refusing a 
breathalyzer test. The accused was forced to 
remain seated in his own excrement longer than 
necessary, denied proper clean-up facilities, subjected 
to rude and ridiculing remarks, and arbitrarily and 
unnecessarily detained. - R. v. Murphy (2001), 29 
M.V.R. (4th) 50 (Sask. Prov. Ct.).
‣ Impaired driving. The accused was handcuffed 
for no reason and pepper-sprayed in the eyes for 
insulting a police officer. - R. v. Spannier, 1996 CanLII 
978 (B.C.S.C.).
Other cases where stays were granted as a remedy for mistreatment by law enforcement officers
PATTING DOWN & SECURING 
MOTORIST IN POLICE CAR NOT 
REASONABLY NECESSARY
R. v. Aucoin, 2012 SCC 66
The 19-year-old accused was stopped 
driving  shortly after midnight in a 
downtown area during  a busy Apple 
Blossom weekend. The licence plate 
on his car was registered to another 
vehicle. While speaking  to the accused, who was a 
newly licensed driver and prohibited from having 
any alcohol in his body, the officer smelled alcohol 
and demanded a roadside screening  test. The 
accused was asked to step out of his vehicle and go 
back to the police car for the screening  test. He sat 
on the rear seat with the door open and his legs and 
feet outside. Although the screening  test indicated a 
result below the legal limit (20mg%), the accused 
was still in breach of the zero alcohol tolerance for a 
newly licenced driver. The officer decided to issue 
the accused a ticket for having  alcohol in his system, 
so he wanted to put him in the back seat of the 
police car while he wrote the ticket in the front seat. 
The accused’s vehicle was going  to be impounded 
and the officer was concerned he could walk away 
and disappear into a crowd while he was writing  the 
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ticket. The officer did a safety pat-down and felt 
something  hard and square in the accused’s left front 
pocket. When asked what it was, the accused said it 
was his wallet. The officer accepted this answer and 
continued the pat-down, feeling  something  soft in 
the accused’s right front pocket. When asked what it 
was the accused replied ecstasy. He was arrested 
and two small baggies containing  100 green pills 
(which later turned out not to be a controlled 
substance) and eight bags of cocaine were removed 
from his pocket. As this was taking  place two other 
police officers arrived in separate vehicles. The 
accused was subsequently charged with cocaine 
possession for the purpose of trafficking  (PPT) as well 
as PPT a substance held out to be ecstasy.  
New Brunswick Provincial Court
The trial judge found the officer’s actions 
were reasonable and did not breach s. 8 
of the Charter given the very unusual 
circumstances that night. First, it was late 
at night and there was no natural lighting  in the area. 
The officer needed the police car light to see what 
he was doing  as he wrote out the ticket. Second, the 
accused had alcohol in his body and the officer 
could not allow him to return to the car where he 
would continue the offence of being  a newly 
licensed driver while prohibited from having  any 
alcohol in his system. Third, the annual Apple 
Blossom festival was underway and there were many 
people around that night. The officer was concerned 
the accused, if left alone on the street, could have 
just walked away. In light of these factors, the judge 
ruled that it was reasonable for the officer to seat the 
accused in the police car while the ticket was 
written and to pat him down in the process. There 
were no Charter breaches, the evidence was 
admitted and the accused was convicted of PPT 
cocaine. He was sentenced to two years in prison.
Nova Scotia Court of Appeal
A majority of the Nova Scotia 
Court of Appeal upheld the trial 
judge’s ruling, finding  the pat-down 
search lawful. In the majority’s 
view, it was reasonable for the officer to detain the 
accused in the rear of the police car and also 
reasonable for the officer to pat him down for 
weapons. Justice Beveridge, however, in a dissenting 
opinion was of the view that the accused’s s. 8 
Charter rights had been breached. In his opinion, the 
officer’s subjective belief that the accused might 
walk away was not objectively justified. Nor was the 
officer justified in placing  the accused in the back of 
the police car or patting  him down - there was no 
reason to believe he posed a safety risk. Justice 
Beveridge also found the accused had been subject 
to an unlawful detention and that his s. 10(b) rights 
were violated. He would have allowed the accused’s 
appeal, set aside the conviction and entered an 
acquittal.  
Supreme Court of Canada
The accused again 
appealed, this time 
t o t h e S u p r e m e 
Court of Canada 
arguing  that his s. 8 rights had been breached by the 
pat-down search. And the Court agreed. All seven 
judges hearing  the case concluded that the police 
were not justified in searching  the accused in this 
case. But they were divided on whether the 
evidence should have been admitted. 
The Search
Justice Moldaver, writing  for five members of the 
Court, first noted that this was not an investigative 
detention case. Rather than being  an investigatory 
detention for a criminal matter, this was a detention 
for two relatively minor traffic infractions under 
Nova Scotia’s Motor Vehicle Act. The accused was 
initially detained because his licence plate was 
registered to a different vehicle, then further 
detained because he was a newly licensed driver 
with alcohol in his body. The nature and extent of 
his detention, however, was then altered in a 
“dramatic way” when he was patted down and 
secured in the back of the police car. This action 
increased the restrictions on the accused’s liberty 
interests and intruded into his privacy interest. 
In Justice Moldaver’s view, the case was not about 
whether the officer had the authority to detain the 
accused in the rear of the police car but whether he 
was justified in exercising  it as he did. In other 
words, was it reasonably necessary, in the particular 
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circumstances of the case, to place the accused in 
the backseat knowing  he would be patted-down? In 
his opinion it was not. Securing  the accused in the 
police car - which fundamentally changed the 
nature of his ongoing  detention - was not reasonably 
necessary in the totality of the circumstances. The 
officer had other options, or reasonable means, by 
which he could have addressed his concerns that the 
accused would disappear into the crowd. Backup 
was close at hand, as evidenced by the arrival of 
other officers while the accused was being  searched, 
and the officer could have “waited an extra minute 
or two to do the paper work, without impinging  on 
the [accused’s] right to be released as soon as 
practicable.” Justice Moldaver stated:
Without wishing to second-guess the actions of 
the police and recognizing, as I do, that the 
police are often required to make split-second 
decisions in fluid and potentially dangerous 
situations, I am nonetheless of the view that [the 
officer’s] actions, though carried out in good 
faith, were not reasonably necessary. [para. 40]
Detaining  the accused in the back of the police car 
was an unlawful detention since there were other 
reasonable means by which the officer could have 
addressed his concern that the accused might flee. 
But for that decision - to place him in the rear of the 
police car - there would have been no pat-down 
search. Since the search was warrantless it was 
presumptively unreasonable, which had not been 
rebutted by the Crown, breaching  the accused’s s. 8 
Charter rights.
s. 24(2) Charter
The majority ruled the evidence admissible. The 
officer acted in good faith. Although the impact on 
the accused’s privacy interests was significant, 
society’s interest in having  the case tried on its merits 
tipped the scales in favour of admission. The 
accused’s appeal was dismissed.
Not An Outright Ban
The majority was clear, however, that there may be 
cases (although rare) where it may be reasonably 
necessary to secure a motorist detained for a 
straightforward motor vehicle infraction in the rear 
of a police car. In such cases, where the facts 
support a finding  of reasonable necessity, there is no 
further balancing  needed between an individual’s 
right to be free from state interference and the 
public’s interest in effective law enforcement, a 
position posited by the minority. 
A Different View by Two
Justices Lebel and Fish agreed with the 
majo r i t y tha t the sea rch was 
unreasonable. In their view it was not 
reasonably necessary to detain the 
accused in the rear of the police car. The detention 
was unlawful and therefore arbitrary. Instead, the 
accused could have stood on the sidewalk to await 
his ticket:
Generally speaking, detaining an individual in 
the locked rear seat of a police car in order to 
write out a ticket for a motor vehicle infraction 
will rarely strike an appropriate balance between 
the public’s interest in effective law enforcement 
and its interest in upholding the right of 
individuals to be free from state interference. 
Had there been reasonable grounds to believe 
that [the accused] might flee, with the result that 
the detention could be said to be necessary, the 
overall reasonableness of the decision to detain 
would then need to be assessed in light of the 
totality of the circumstances, including the 
nature and extent of the interference with liberty 
and the importance of the public purpose served 
by that interference. The seriousness of the 
offence is therefore a relevant consideration. In 
my view, where the public purpose served by 
the interference is the enforcement of a 
regulatory offence and the interference involves 
the police assuming complete control over an 
individual’s movements, the balance will 
generally not favour recognizing a police power. 
[references omitted, para. 86]
Since the detention was unlawful the protective pat-
down search was unreasonable. But even if the 
detention was lawful the search would nonetheless 
be unreasonable. There were no reasonable grounds 
for the officer to believe his safety of the safety of 
others was as risk. Plus, the search exceeded the 
scope of one that was reasonably designed to locate 
weapons. The item the officer felt was soft and could 
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not justify a concern for officer safety and the 
questioning  that followed it. In the minority’s 
opinion, the evidence should be excluded under s. 
24(2). The Charter-infringing  conduct was serious 
and the impact on the accused’s Charter protected 
interests was significant.
Complete case available at www.scc-csc.gc.ca
LOW VIRAL COUNT & CONDOM 
USE NEGATES REALISTIC 
POSSIBILITY OF HIV 
TRANSMISSION
R. v. Mabior, 2012 SCC 47
The accused had sex with nine 
complainants but did not tell them he 
was HIV-positive. On one occasion 
he said that he had no sexually 
transmitted diseases. On some 
occasions he wore condoms while other times he 
did not. Sometimes the condoms broke or were 
removed, and in some cases the precise nature of 
the protections taken was unclear. The complainants 
all consented to sexual intercourse with the accused 
but said that they would not have consented if they 
had known he was HIV-positive. None of them 
contracted HIV. The accused was charged with 10 
counts of aggravated sexual assault (and other 
related offences) involving  the nine complainants 
based on his failure to disclose to them that he was 
HIV-positive.
Manitoba Court of Queen’s Bench
The accused called evidence that he was 
under treatment and not infectious, or 
presented only a low risk of infection. The 
judge took the approach that any risk of 
HIV transmission, however small, constituted 
“significant risk of serious bodily harm.” The judge 
entered convictions on six of the aggravated sexual 
assault counts where it was established that his viral 
load was not undetectable or no condom was used. 
He acquitted the accused on the other four counts 
finding  that sexual intercourse using  a condom when 
viral loads were undetectable did not place a sexual 
partner at “significant risk of serious bodily harm.”
Manitoba Court of Appeal
The accused’s appeal of his six 
convictions resulted in four of them 
being  overturned and acquittals 
being  entered. The Manitoba Court 
of Appeal held that “significant risk” connoted a 
high risk of HIV transmission. In applying  this high 
risk approach, the Court of Appeal held that condom 
use reduced the risk of HIV transmission “below the 
level of significance.” In its view, either low viral 
loads or condom use could negate the significant 
risk required for a conviction. The remaining  two 
convictions were upheld.
Supreme Court of Canada
The Crown appealed the four 
acquittals to the Supreme 
Cour t o f Canada. In an 
unanimous seven member 
opinion, the Supreme Court 
ruled that a person may be found guilty of 
aggravated sexual assault (s. 273 of the Criminal 
Code) if they fail to disclose their HIV-positive status 
before intercourse and there is a realistic possibility 
that HIV will be transmitted. However, the Supreme 
Court clarified that if the HIV-positive person has a 
low viral count as a result of treatment and there is 
condom protection used, the threshold of a realistic 
possibility of transmission is not met and an 
acquittal will follow.
Fraud Vitiating Consent
Under s. 265 of the Criminal Code sex without 
consent is sexual assault. In R. v. Cuerrier, [1998] 2 
S.C.R. 371 the Supreme Court had earlier 
established that failure to advise a partner of one’s 
HIV status may constitute fraud vitiating  consent. 
Although HIV can be controlled by medication, it is 
a serious and life-endangering  incurable chronic 
infection that, if untreated, can result in death. Non-
disclosure can amount to fraud because both its 
elements are established: 
(1) a dishonest act: misrepresentation or failing  to 
disclose HIV status; and 
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(2) a deprivation: denying  the complainant 
knowledge which would have caused her to 
refuse sexual relations that exposed her to a 
significant risk of serious bodily harm. 
Furthermore, since HIV poses a risk of serious 
bodily harm, the failure to advise a sexual partner of 
one’s HIV status may lead to a conviction for 
aggravated sexual assault under s. 273(1) of the 
Criminal Code, which attracts a maximum sentence 
of life imprisonment. 
So just when does non-disclosure of HIV status 
amount to fraud vitiating  consent for the purposes of 
sexual assault? When sexual relations with an HIV-
positive person pose a “significant risk of serious 
bodily harm.” In defining  what a significant risk of 
serious bodily harm is, Chief Justice McLachlin 
stated:
[A] “significant risk of serious bodily harm” 
connotes a position between the extremes of no 
risk (the trial judge’s test) and “high risk’ (the 
Court of Appeal’s test). Where there is a realistic 
possibility of transmission of HIV, a significant 
risk of serious bodily harm is established, and 
the deprivation element of the Cuerrier test is 
met. [para. 84]
She then noted the following  considerations in 
finding  that the requirement of “significant risk of 
serious bodily harm” should be read as requiring 
disclosure of HIV status if there is a realistic 
possibility of HIV transmission:
• A “significant risk of serious bodily harm” 
cannot mean any risk, however small. This 
would set the threshold for criminal conduct 
too low. 
• A standard of “high” risk does not give 
adequate weight to the nature of the harm 
involved in HIV transmission. This would set 
the threshold for criminal conduct too high and 
might condone irresponsible and reprehensible 
conduct. 
• There is an inverse relationship between the 
degree of harm and risk of transmission. The 
more serious the nature of the harm, the lower 
the probability of transmission need be to 
amount to a “significant risk of serious bodily 
harm.”
• A standard of a realistic possibility of HIV 
transmission avoids setting  the bar for criminal 
conviction too high or too low and strikes the 
appropriate balance between the complainant’s 
interest in autonomy and equality and the need 
to prevent over-extension of criminal sanctions.
If there is no realistic possibility of HIV transmission, 
failure to disclose that one has HIV will not 
constitute fraud vitiating  consent to sex under s. 
265(3)(c).
“Failure to disclose (the dishonest act) amounts to fraud where the complainant would not have 
consented had he or she known the accused was HIV-positive, and where sexual contact poses 
a significant risk of or causes actual serious bodily harm (deprivation).  A significant risk of 
serious bodily harm is established by a realistic possibility of transmission of HIV.”  
BY THE BOOK:
Assault & Sexual Assault Provisions: 
Criminal Code
s.  265 (1) A person commits an assault  when (a) 
without the consent of  another person,  he 
applies force intentionally to that  other 
person, directly or indirectly; ...  
(2)  This section applies to all forms of assault, including 
sexual assault . . . and aggravated sexual assault.
(3) For the purposes of this section, no consent is obtained 
where the complainant submits or does not resist by reason 
of ... (c) fraud; ...
s.  273  (1) Every one commits an aggravated sexual assault 
who, in committing  a sexual assault, wounds, maims, 
disfigures or endangers the life of the complainant.
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Realistic Possibility of HIV Transmission?
Just when does the non-disclosure of HIV-positive 
status not entail a realistic possibility of HIV 
transmission?  The Supreme Court found that there 
will not be a realistic possibility of HIV transmission 
if (1) the accused’s viral load at the time of sexual 
relations was low and (2) condom protection was 
used. 
Low viral count (as opposed to undetectable): The 
transmissibility of HIV is proportional to the viral 
load (the quantity of HIV copies in the blood). 
Antiretroviral therapy can shrink the viral load 
rapidly, but does not eliminate it altogether. Thus, a 
sexual partner can still be exposed to a realistic 
possibility of transmission.  
Condom use: Although the Supreme Court found it 
“undisputed that HIV does not pass through good 
quality male or female latex condoms” it also noted 
that “condom use is not fail-safe, due to the 
possibility of condom failure and human error.” 
Thus, condom protection alone does not preclude a 
realistic possibility of transmission.
The risk of transmission resulting  from the combined 
effect of condom use and a low viral load is 
extremely low such that the risk is reduced to a 
speculative possibility rather than a realistic 
possibility. Since the requirement of significant risk 
of serious bodily harm will not be met with a low 
viral count and condom use, there is no deprivation 
and failure to disclose HIV status will not constitute 
fraud vitiating  consent under s. 265(3)(c). Chief 
Justice McLachlin concluded:
To summarize, to obtain a conviction under ss. 
265(3)(c) and 273, the Crown must show that 
the complainant’s consent to sexual intercourse 
was vitiated by the accused’s fraud as to his HIV 
status. Failure to disclose (the dishonest act) 
amounts to fraud where the complainant would 
not have consented had he or she known the 
accused was HIV-positive, and where sexual 
contact poses a significant risk of or causes 
actual serious bodily harm (deprivation).  A 
significant risk of serious bodily harm is 
established by a realistic possibility of 
transmission of HIV.  On the evidence before us, 
a realistic possibility of transmission is negated 
by evidence that the accused’s viral load was 
low at the time of intercourse and that condom 
protection was used.  However, the general 
proposition that a low viral load combined with 
condom use negates a realistic possibility of 
transmission of HIV does not preclude the 
common law from adapting to future advances 
in treatment and to circumstances where risk 
factors other than those considered in the 
present case are at play. 
The usual rules of evidence and proof apply. 
The Crown bears the burden of establishing the 
elements of the offence — a dishonest act and 
deprivation — beyond a reasonable doubt. 
Where the Crown has made a prima facie case 
of deception and deprivation as described in 
these reasons, a tactical burden may fall on the 
accused to raise a reasonable doubt, by calling 
evidence that he had a low viral load at the time 
and that condom protection was used. [paras. 
104-105]
Results
As a consequence of the Supreme Court’s analysis, 
three of the four convictions entered by the trial 
judge were maintained. In three of the cases the 
accused had a low viral load at the time of 
intercourse but did not use a condom. In the fourth 
case where a conviction was registered, the accused 
had a low viral load and used a condom. This 
negated a realistic possibility of transmission and 
therefore did not expose the complainant to a 
significant risk of serious bodily harm. An acquittal 
was entered in this one case.
Complete case available at www.scc-csc.gc.ca
LEGALLY SPEAKING:
Sentencing: Firearms Offences
“[F]irearms, and in particular handguns, are 
extremely dangerous when possessed for 
an illicit purpose. That purpose can only be 
to threaten or inflict serious bodily harm or death. 
Sentences for these types of offences must reflect 
society’s absolute rejection of such unacceptable 
conduct.” - British Columbia Court of Appeal Justice 
Smith, R. v. Guha, 2012 BCCA 423 at para. 30.  
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DELAY JUSTIFIED: 
DETENTION NOT ARBITRARY 
R. v. Viszlai, 2012 BCCA 442
 
A detective called another police 
detachment to arrest the accused, a 
Scout leader, at a Scout jamboree for 
some previous sexual offences. The 
detective asked that the accused be 
held in custody overnight so she could interview 
him the following  morning. He was taken into 
custody at 7:03 pm and advised of his right to 
counsel. He was driven to the police station, booked 
and spoke to legal aid in private at 7:52 am. He told 
the arresting  officer that he was satisfied with the 
advice he had received. The following  morning  the 
investigating  detective drove from Victoria to 
Nanaimo, then flew to Sechelt and interviewed the 
accused from 9:50 am to 11:50 am. Before starting 
the interview, the detective advised the accused of 
the reason for his arrest, the right to counsel and that 
he was not obliged to say anything. He admitted to 
sexually assaulting  two victims and wrote out an 
apology to them. The accused was then released on 
a Promise to Appear (PTA) at 12:50 pm, about 18 
hours after he was arrested.
 
British Columbia Supreme Court
 
The accused argued he was arbitrarily 
detained because he was held overnight 
to be interviewed the following  morning. 
In his view, he should have been released 
by police sooner or taken before a JJP for a hearing. 
The judge rejected this, finding  that the accused had 
been lawfully arrested and detained. The arrest was 
not planned and the delay in taking  a statement from 
the accused was justified. “In the circumstances, [the 
police] actions cannot be regarded as a deliberate 
attempt to circumvent the rights of the accused to be 
released as soon as practicable,” said the judge. The 
accused’s statement was admissible and he was 
convicted by a jury of sex offences.
 
British Columbia Court of Appeal
 
The accused again argued he was 
arbitrarily detained, suggesting  his 
continued post-arrest detention 
became unlawful because he should have been 
released as soon as practicable by either police 
(under ss. 497 and 498 of the Criminal Code) or 
appear before a JJP without unreasonable delay. 
After all, he claimed, the police released him on a 
PTA at the end of the interview which evidenced 
that he was not considered a public risk. He 
suggested the police could not detain an arrestee for 
the purpose of facilitating an interview.
 
This argument, however, was rejected by the Court 
of Appeal. Both ss. 497(1.1) and 498(1.1) contain a 
provision that authorizes the continued detention of 
an arrestee when there are reasonable grounds to 
believe it is necessary in the public interest to secure 
and preserve evidence of or relating  to the offence. 
This evidence includes a statement. “The police are 
not required to release a person who has been 
lawfully arrested when there are reasonable grounds 
to believe that the continued detention of that 
person is needed for the purpose of obtaining 
evidence,” said Justice Frankel. “Nothing  in the 
language of the exception differentiates one 
investigative technique from another, nor does it 
differentiate one form of evidence from another.” 
Nor was it necessary for the detective to have 
another officer in Sechelt do a surrogate interview. 
The detective was responsible for the investigation, 
was a member of a specialized investigative unit, 
and took expeditious steps to travel to Sechelt. The 
15 hour delay in taking  a statement after arrest in 
these circumstances did not render the detention 
arbitrary. The police acted reasonably.
The accused’s appeal was granted on other grounds.
 
Complete case available at www.courts.gov.bc.ca
POINTS TO PONDER - Viszlai Case 
• Whether the delay in releasing  someone amounts  to an 
arbitrary detention is fact driven. In other words, it 
depends on the circumstances.
• This case does not mean that you can always detain 
someone for 15 hrs before taking  a statement.  The facts 
matter.
• Be prepared to explain the delay in interviewing.
• A statement is considered evidence for the exceptions 
to Criminal Code  release provisions when it is 
necessary in the public interest  to “secure or preserve 
evidence of or relating to the offence.”
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REMAND DID NOT RENEW 
RIGHT TO COUNSEL
R. v. Bhander, 2012 BCCA 
 
Following  a shooting, the accused 
was arrested for one count of murder 
and one count of attempted murder. 
He was deliberately arrested on a 
Friday to be held in custody over the 
weekend. He was advised of his right to counsel, 
right to silence and transported to the police station. 
He spoke to counsel on the phone and also had a 40 
minute face-to-face meeting  at the police station 
with a lawyer. Counsel told police he wanted to 
speak again with the accused if charges were laid. 
Police asked the accused if he had received and 
understood the legal advice provided and he replied 
in the affirmative. Police tried to conduct a short 
interview with the accused, but he repeatedly 
invoked his right to silence and said any questions 
should go to his lawyer.
 
On the following  day (Saturday), the accused was 
charged only with first degree murder. His lawyer 
participated in the remand hearing  and asked that 
the accused go to the Surrey Pre-trial Centre pending 
his court appearance on Monday. The JJP  found he 
had no jurisdiction to direct the location of the 
accused’s custody over the weekend but did make a 
recommendation that he be held at the Pre-Trial 
Centre. The police, however, made no effort to 
comply with the recommendation. Shortly after the 
remand hearing  the accused was interviewed by 
police for 4 hours and 15 minutes. His lawyer’s 
articling  student attended at the police station while 
the interview was in progress and asked to see the 
accused so further legal advice could be provided, 
but police refused his request.
 
Then on Sunday, the accused’s counsel again tried to 
arrange a meeting  with the accused by leaving  a 
message with police but he did not receive a call 
back. The accused also asked the jail guard if he 
could call his lawyer to “make sure he’s at court 
tomorrow” but this was not facilitated. On Sunday 
evening  the accused was again interviewed, this 
time for about 2 ½ hours. He initially exercised his 
right to silence but then was shown some evidence, 
including  a set of keys found at the scene. He then 
began to provide an account of the shooting, 
admitting  he had shot the deceased. Before the 
confession the accused said, “And it’s going  against 
for what my lawyer told me to do, and stuff like that 
right?” 
British Columbia Supreme Court
The trial judge noted that the arrest was 
made on Friday so police could 
“optimize their ability to coordinate 
resources and undertake var ious 
investigative procedures” while the accused was in 
custody. But he found no Charter violations and 
admitted the confession. The accused was convicted 
of second degree murder by a jury.
British Columbia Court of Appeal
The accused appealed, in part, that 
the confession was obtained 
following  Charter  breaches and 
should be inadmissible under s. 
24(2). These violations included:
 
s. 10(b): Change in Jeopardy
The accused asserted that when he was charged with 
first degree murder and remanded in custody this 
was an “objectively observable” change in jeopardy 
requiring  a renewed right to speak to a lawyer. But 
the Court of Appeal disagreed. There was no change 
in circumstances that required a further opportunity 
to consult counsel. The accused had been arrested 
for murder and attempted murder and charged with 
first degree murder. This did not alter or elevate the 
general nature of the jeopardy he faced. “The fact of 
the remand order did not change [the accused’s] 
jeopardy from that for which he was arrested,” said 
Justice Saunders for the Court.
s. 10(b): New Non-Routine Procedure 
The accused submitted he was subjected to a new 
“non-routine” procedure when remanded which 
required a renewed right to speak to a lawyer. But 
the remand was not such a new “non-routine” 
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procedure involving  a detainee, like a polygraph 
examination or participation in a line-up. His 
detention expectations may have changed but this 
did not support a renewed right to counsel.
s. 9 Charter: Arbitrary Detention  
The accused said he was arbitrarily detained when 
police continued to question him after the judicial 
remand and made no attempt to move him to the 
pre-trial centre as recommended by the JJP. The 
Court of Appeal also rejected this submission. The 
police did not violate any terms of the remand order
—it authorized further detention without specifying 
the location for the detention. Plus, the accused’s 
position regarding  the investigation was the same 
before as after the remand order. The remand order 
itself did not trigger a fresh right to counsel.
Complete case available at www.courts.gov.bc.ca
GROUNDS VIEWED 
CUMULATIVELY PROVIDED 
BASIS FOR WARRANT
R. v. Tran, 2012 BCCA 386
Police obtained a search warrant 
based on information from two 
unnamed neighbours, searches of 
data banks kept by the police and 
other government sources, and some 
observations by police officers who attended the 
area. The ITO included the following information:
From Neighbours
 
• Both told the police that no one resided at the 
residence and that the blinds were always 
closed.
• One said that the house had been up for sale 
two years previously and that when it did not 
sell the owners did some renovations on the 
place.
• Both said that they detected an odour of 
marihuana in the immediate vicinity of the 
house.
• One said that every night between 5 pm and 7 
pm an Asian family consisting  of a man, 
woman and two children arrived at the house 
and stayed for only one or two hours.
• One neighbour said that there was a lock box 
on the front door that “had been there forever” 
and that people used the garage to enter the 
residence, not the front door.
From Police Observations
• A police officer drove to the residence on the 
same day that the first neighbour contacted the 
police and observed a vehicle parked in the 
driveway. He found that the vehicle was 
registered to a Thi Kim Vu whose residence was 
listed as an apartment in Langley.
• The police attended the house on a couple of 
occasions and could smell an odour of 
marihuana in the air. They checked the houses 
on either side of the suspected residence and 
confirmed that those houses did not contain 
marihuana grow operations.
• The police confirmed that the blinds on the 
front of the house were closed, that there was a 
lock box near the front door and that the 
vehicle registered to Thi Kim Vu was parked by 
the residence.
From Data Searches
• A registry search disclosed that the house was 
registered to a Lan T. Vu. A further search 
revealed that the account holder of Hydro 
services was listed as Vu.
• One of the two neighbours called to tell the 
police that there was a vehicle at the residence 
which attended daily. Motor vehicle records 
indicated the licence plate’s owner was the 
accused, who had the same Langley address as 
Thi Kim Vu, the owner of the other vehicle seen 
at the residence.
• The accused had 2006 convictions in Alberta 
for theft and production of marihuana.
• Lan T. Vu was present at the residence in 2006 
when Abbotsford police inspected the house. 
The report showed that there was evidence of 
“a previous grow operation but not enough to 
lay charges.”
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Police entered the property and found an indoor 
marihuana grow operation. 
British Columbia Supreme Court
The trial judge found the individual 
pieces of information were insufficient to 
provide the necessary grounds for the 
warrant’s issuance, but when considered 
together did meet the reasonable grounds threshold 
that the residence likely housed a grow op. The 
judge stated:
While each of these pieces of information comes 
with a caveat, the caveat sometimes amounting 
to a significant reservation, and sometimes being 
more in the nature of a quibble, nonetheless 
each of them adds something to the grounds. In 
my view, no single piece of information is 
sufficient, however, considered in total they are 
additive to the degree necessary for the 
conclusion that an authorizing  Judicial Justice of 
the Peace could judicially assess them as 
amounting to reasonable grounds, or in other 
words, as providing a reasonable probability of 
discovery of evidence of the suspected offence; 
and in this case, that the residence likely housed 
a grow-op
The accused was convicted of producing  marihuana, 
and possessing  marihuana for the purpose of 
trafficking.
British Columbia Court of Appeal
Th e a c c u s e d a p p e a l e d h i s 
convictions on the ground that the 
trial judge erred in concluding  that 
the search of the house was made 
pursuant to a valid search warrant because it was not 
properly supported by reasonable grounds. In his 
view, the evidence obtained by executing  the 
warrant  should have been excluded under s. 24(2). 
But the Court of Appeal disagreed. Although the trial 
judge acknowledged that each piece of information 
on its own was not particularly strong, he examined 
the evidence and applied the proper tests in 
concluding  reasonable grounds existed. The 
accused’s appeal was dismissed. 
Complete case available at www.courts.gov.bc.ca
REASONABLE SUSPICION 
TRIGGERS OPPORTUNITY TO 
COMMIT CRIME
R. v. Gladue, 2012 ABCA 143
 
Police received a tip from a first time 
informant with a criminal record that 
a phone number was being  used to 
sell crack cocaine in a dial-a-dope 
scheme. The police, without taking 
steps to verify the tip, called the phone number to 
arrange a cocaine purchase. An officer spoke to an 
unidentified male and, to determine if he was a drug 
dealer, asked him if he was “working” or “rolling”. 
The male responded positively and asked “Who are 
you?”. The officer replied “Johnny” and then the 
male asked what he wanted. The officer asked if he 
could get “four for a hundred” (meaning  four half-
gram pieces of crack cocaine for $100). The male 
said it would cost $110, agreed to meet at a 
specified location and sold the officer about two 
grams of cocaine. 
Alberta Court of Queen’s Bench
 
The accused pled guilty to trafficking  in 
cocaine but the judge entered a stay of 
proceedings on the basis of entrapment. 
He found the police did not have a 
reasonable suspicion that the accused was already 
engaged in criminal activity before they called the 
dial-a-dope number. Police did not know him 
personally nor was there evidence they were aware 
of his name. Moreover, even during  the call, the 
police did not develop a reasonable suspicion 
before providing  him with an opportunity to commit 
a crime. The words “rolling” or “working” were 
capable of an interpretation that did not necessarily 
suggest a drug  interaction. Plus, there was no expert 
evidence on drug  trafficking  terminology. In the 
judge’s view, the knowledge gained during  the 
phone call was “too imprecise and too vague to 
bolster the already insufficient suspicion of the 
police prior to the call.” An acquittal was entered. 
“[A reasonable suspicion] must exist before 
the opportunity to commit an offence is 
provided.”
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 Alberta Court of Appeal
The Crown argued that the trial 
judge misinterpreted the test for 
entrapment, applied too high a 
standard for reasonable suspicion 
and failed to find that the police were engaged in a 
bona fide investigation. The Court of Appeal first 
described the test for entrapment:
Entrapment may be found when “the authorities 
provide a person with an opportunity to commit 
an offence without acting on a reasonable 
suspicion that this person is already engaged in 
criminal activity or pursuant to a bona fide 
inquiry”. The bona fide inquiry exception 
permits the police to present an opportunity to 
commit a crime to a person associated with a 
location where it is reasonably suspected that 
criminal activity is taking place. Although a 
reasonable suspicion that a person is engaged in 
criminal activity can be developed during the 
course of an investigation of a tip, it must exist 
before the opportunity to commit an offence is 
provided. [references omitted, para. 9]
In addition, the court noted that it was not necessary 
that the identity of the person be pre-established. 
The police can acquire a reasonable suspicion of a 
person without knowing who they are. 
In this case, the officer provided the accused with an 
opportunity to commit a crime during  the initial 
phone call when he asked if he could get “four for a 
hundred”. It was at this point - before the 
opportunity was provided - that a reasonable 
suspicion the accused was engaged in criminal 
activity had to exist. The “unverified tip, received 
from a first time informant with a criminal record, 
was not enough to raise a reasonable suspicion,” 
said Justice Costigan for the Court of Appeal. Nor 
was the conversation, with the use of the words 
“rolling” or “working”, enough to elevate the 
circumstances beyond mere suspicion. 
The Court of Appeal also rejected the Crown’s 
submission that the police were engaged in a bona 
fide investigation of a unique digital location, similar 
in concept to a geographic location, in calling  the 
dial-a-doper number. “Assuming, without deciding, 
that a phone can be equated to a specific physical 
location, the requirement for a reasonable suspicion 
must still be met,” said Justice Costigan. Since the 
reasonable suspicion requirement was not met, the 
Crown’s appeal was dismissed.
Complete case available at www.albertacourts.ab.ca
Supreme Court of Canada
The Crown sought leave to appeal 
the Alberta Court of Appeal’s 
judgement before the Supreme 
Court of Canada. The Crown’s 
application, however, was dismissed by a panel of 
three Supreme Court justices without reasons. R. v. 
Gladue, [2012] S.C.C.A. No. 305
POLICE DUTY TO INFORM OF 
RIGHTS: DETAINEE’S DUTY TO 
PURSUE THEM
R. v. MacGregor, 2012 NSCA 18
 
Sometime after midnight the accused 
was stopped at a police checkpoint. 
When an officer noted a smell of 
alcohol the accused said he had a 
couple of drinks earlier in the 
evening. He also said that he had used mouthwash 
prior to leaving  his office, about 15 to 30 minutes 
before being  stopped. The officer believed the 
accused had alcohol in his body and gave the 
“Entrapment may be found when ‘the authorities provide a person with an opportunity to 
commit an offence without acting on a reasonable suspicion that this person is already engaged 
in criminal activity or pursuant to a bona fide inquiry’. The bona fide inquiry exception permits 
the police to present an opportunity to commit a crime to a person associated with a location 
where it is reasonably suspected that criminal activity is taking place.”
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approved screening  device (ASD) demand.  The 
accused failed the ASD and the breathalyzer 
demand followed. The accused was then arrested for 
impaired driving  and informed of his right to 
counsel. He said that he understood his rights and 
when asked if he would like to speak to counsel, 
said, “Not right now, thank you”.   The officer then 
said:
 
I’ll let you know that if you change your mind at 
anytime tonight during this whole process, that 
you want to talk to a lawyer, just let myself or 
any other officer know, and we will make sure 
that you get in contact with a lawyer, okay?
 
The accused responded “Yeah.” When the officer 
provided information about legal aid the accused 
indicated he understood. The standard police 
caution was also given. At the police station the 
accused did not ask to speak to a lawyer nor was he 
asked if he wanted to consult one. He was 
introduced to a breath technician and provided two 
breath samples above the legal limit. He was 
charged with impaired driving and over 80mg%. 
Nova Scotia Provincial Court
The accused testified that he didn’t want 
to speak to a lawyer at the roadside 
because he didn’t have a cell phone and 
he was not offered one, nor was there 
any privacy at that point. He said he intended to call 
a lawyer when he arrived at the police station, 
expecting  that he would be given an opportunity to 
do so. But he never told the police this because he 
was in an unfamiliar setting  and was merely doing 
what he was asked to do. Had he been offered a 
telephone, he claimed he would have called a 
lawyer. The trial judge concluded that the accused’s 
response “not right now” was equivocal, that he had 
not waived his right to counsel and that the police 
were obligated to either provide him with a 
reasonable opportunity to call a lawyer or obtain a 
clear and unequivocal waiver from him.  Since the 
police did neither, s. 10(b) of the Charter was 
breached and the evidence of the breathalyzer 
results were excluded under s. 24(2). The accused 
was acquitted. 
Nova Scotia Supreme Court
On appeal by Crown, a Nova Scotia 
Supreme Court judge found that the “not 
right now” response was an adequate 
waiver of the accused’s right to counsel. 
In his view, even though the accused understood his 
rights and intended to call a lawyer, there was no 
evidence that anything  interfered with his 
opportunity to ask to speak to counsel before he 
submitted to breathalyzer testing. He further held 
that there was no additional obligation upon the 
police to reiterate the offer of contacting  counsel at 
the police station. In the alternative, the appeal 
judge opined that the breath test results were 
admissible under s. 24(2). He ordered the case sent 
back to the trial judge. 
Nova Scotia Court of Appeal
The accused then challenged the 
appeal judge’s ruling  to the Nova 
Scotia Court of Appeal. 
 
s. 10(b) Charter
Section 10(b) provides that “Everyone has the right 
on arrest or detention ... (b) to retain and instruct 
counsel without delay and to be informed of that 
right.” This imposes two duties on the police, Justice 
Bryson on behalf of the Court of Appeal said:
 
There are two elements to a s. 10(b) right. The 
f i r s t i s in format ional and the second 
implementational.  In other words, a detained 
person has to be properly informed about his or 
her rights. The second element requires that the 
detained person has to be given an opportunity 
to consult a lawyer if he or she chooses to do so. 
[para. 23]
 
Informational Duty
The Court of Appeal agreed with the lower courts 
that the accused’s response “not right now” was 
equivocal. However, unlike the trial judge’s 
conclusion that the police had to either obtain a 
waiver or reiterate the right to speak to counsel at 
the police station, Justice Bryson was of the view 
that police had properly discharged their duties. 
“The police certainly had no obligation to seek and 
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obtain a waiver from [the accused],” he said. “Their 
obligation was to convey to [the accused] that his 
right to counsel was ongoing. This is precisely what 
they did.” The police reply to the accused's “not 
right now” was appropriate and could not be 
clearer:  
• It recognized that the accused did not want to call 
a lawyer then and there;
• It recognized that he may wish to call a lawyer 
later on that evening “during the process”;
• It confirmed that the accused’s right to consult 
counsel was ongoing through the process, and 
was not limited to “then and there” in the police 
cruiser;
• It told the accused how to implement his right to 
consult counsel.  He need only advise police at 
any time during  the process.  Police would then 
ensure that he got in contact with a lawyer.
 
Once the accused was aware of his rights, he had an 
obligation to pursue them. There was no evidence to 
indicate a lack of understanding, a failure to 
adequately inform, nor an indication that the 
accused thought he had lost the right to speak to a 
lawyer once he got to the police station. The police 
had met the duty to inform the accused of his s. 
10(b) rights.
 
Implementational Duty
 
Once police have discharged the informational 
component of a s. 10(b), the implementation 
component arises only when the accused expresses 
a desire to exercise those rights. In this case the 
accused never testified that he had no opportunity to 
express a desire to call a lawyer. There was ample 
time for the accused to utter a few words in order to 
exercise his right to consult counsel. Throughout his 
time in custody he was in the presence of police 
officers, but said nothing  to them. “The fact that he 
was in unfamiliar circumstances and probably found 
the experience novel and intimidating, may explain 
his subjective state of mind,” said Justice Bryson.  
“But it is not objective evidence that there was no 
opportunity to call a lawyer.” The accused’s right to 
counsel was not breached. The accused’s appeal was 
dismissed and a new trial was ordered. 
Complete case available at www.canlii.org
NO HARD & FAST RULES FOR 
INVESTIGATIVE ARTICULABLE 
CAUSE
R. v. Tran, 2012 NBCA 74
The accused was stopped in a 
vehicle checkpoint campaign on the 
TransCanada Highway. A police 
officer, with 21 years of experience 
and attached for the last eight years 
to a Roving  Traffic Unit that conducts major motor 
vehicle check stop operations, noticed a number of 
“indicators” that made him suspicious the accused 
was transporting contraband:
He had a British Columbia driver’s license—a 
contraband-source province;
He was driving  a car rented in Montreal—in the 
officer’s experience those who transport 
contraband do not want to have their personal 
vehicles seized so they rent;
He explained that he had moved from British 
Columbia to Montreal because of the trouble 
with the Olympics;
He was travelling  to Moncton because a new 
casino had opened and he believed one could 
win more easily at that location, as opposed to 
a more established casino.
The passenger in the front right seat was 
extremely nervous.
There was a pillow and blanket in the back seat
—if there is contraband in a vehicle, the 
occupants often sleep in the car to protect it.
A CPIC search revealed the accused had a 
firearm prohibition from British Columbia, a 
drug  trafficking  charge from Manitoba and an 
outstanding  warrant for an impaired driving 
charge from Quebec, suggesting  the accused 
had changed his place of residence often.
 
This constellation of indicators matched patterns the 
police officer had seen repeatedly during  his career 
and they were consistent with a person travelling 
with contraband. A subsequent search of the 
accused’s vehicle uncovered 20 pounds of 
marihuana in a suitcase in the trunk. The accused 
was charged with possessing  cannabis for the 
purpose of trafficking.  
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New Brunswick Provincial Court
 
The officer testified that the constellation 
of indictors matched patterns he had seen 
repeatedly during  his career and were 
consistent with a person travelling  with 
contraband. Although the police officer testified that 
no single indicator by itself was indicative of 
criminal activity, the trial judge found the indicators 
cited were capable of innocuous explanation and 
collectively were inappropriate to give 
rise to reasonable and probable 
grounds for the search. The judge 
concluded the police were on a 
“fishing  expedition” and the search was 
unreasonable. The detention was also 
found to be arbitrary since the accused 
was detained on the pretence of 
questioning  him on his CPIC record. 
The evidence was excluded under s. 
24(2) and the accused was acquitted.
 
New Brunswick Court of Appeal
The Crown appealed 
the trial judge’s ruling  arguing, 
among  other grounds, that the 
police did not lack the necessary 
“reasonable grounds to suspect” the accused was 
involved in criminal activity before detaining  him. In 
the Crown’s view, the judge focused on the 
individual grounds as opposed to using  a “totality of 
circumstances” assessment. Justice Larlee, delivering 
the unanimous Court of Appeal ruling, agreed. 
Determining  whether the police had “reasonable 
grounds to suspect” that a person was involved in 
criminal activity involves both an objective and 
subjective standard. The objective reasonableness of 
the detaining  officer’s grounds “must be assessed 
from the standpoint of the reasonable person 
‘standing  in the shoes of the police officer’”. “There 
are no hard and fast rules concerning  investigative 
detention and the assessment of articulable cause, 
and no fixed checklist of factors,” said Justice Larlee. 
“The matter of sufficiency of grounds must be 
resolved on a case by case basis.”  He continued:
 
Reasonable suspicion is a lower standard than 
that of reasonable and probable grounds. It does 
not demand absolute certainty or even 
reasonable probability. It means something more 
than a mere suspicion and something less than a 
belief based upon reasonable and 
probable grounds. The standard is 
often contrasted with indiscriminate 
police conduct based on a hunch, 
intuition, or speculation, none of 
which are sufficient to support an 
objectively reasonable suspicion. 
[para. 8]
 
In this case, the trial judge explained 
away each of the individual grounds 
rather than considering  the totality of 
the circumstances (grounds or 
indicators). “Rather than asking 
whether the existing  grounds were 
sufficient to establish reasonable 
suspicion, the trial judge erred in law by taking  each 
and every indicator given by the police officer and 
speculating  about its potential interpretation without 
considering  the global context,” said Justice Larlee. 
For example, the trial judge speculated on, 
trivialized and attempted to explain away the 
indicators.
 
Here, Justice Larlee found “the cumulative effect of 
the indicators noted by this experienced police 
officer met the threshold of reasonable grounds to 
suspect.” The accused’s detention was not arbitrary 
and the evidence was admissible. The Crown’s 
appeal was allowed, the accused’s acquittal was set 
aside and a new trial was ordered.
Complete case available at www.canlii.org
“There are no hard and 
fast rules concerning 
investigative detention 
and the assessment of 
articulable cause, and 
no fixed checklist of 
factors: the matter of 
sufficiency of grounds 
must be resolved on a 
case by case basis.”
“Reasonable suspicion is a lower standard than that of reasonable and probable grounds. It 
does not demand absolute certainty or even reasonable probability. It means something 
more than a mere suspicion and something less than a belief based upon reasonable and 
probable grounds.”
The British Columbia Association of Chiefs of Police, the 
Ministry of Public Safety and Solicitor General, and the 
Justice Institute of British Columbia, Police Academy are 
hosting the Police Leadership Conference in Vancouver, 
British Columbia. This is Canada's largest police leadership 
conference. This Police Leadership Conference will provide 
an opportunity for delegates to hear leadership topics 
discussed by world-renowned speakers.
Leadership in policing is not bound by position or rank and 
this conference will provide delegates from the police 
community with an opportunity to engage in a variety of 
leadership areas. The Police Leadership Conference will 
bring together experts who will provide current, lively, and 
interesting topics on leadership. The carefully chosen list of 
keynote speakers will provide a first class opportunity at a 
first class venue to hear some of the world's outstanding 
authorities on leadership, the challenges facing the policing 
community and how to overcome those challenges.
The Service of Policing:               
Meeting Public Expectation
April 7 - 9, 2013
www.policeleadershipconference.com
Rick Mercer chronicles, satirizes and ultimately celebrates all that is great and irreverent about this 
country. Known as "Canada's Unofficial Opposition," Mercer is our most popular comic, a political 
satirist who knows exactly what matters to regular Canadians and what makes them laugh. Born in 
St. John's, Newfoundland, Mercer has won over 25 Gemini Awards.                                          
Clarence Joseph Louie, first elected as Chief of the Osoyoos Indian Band in December 1984, has 
consistently emphasized economic development as a means to improve his people’s standard of 
living. Under his direction (20+ years), the Band has become a multi-faceted corporation that owns 
and manages nine businesses and employs hundreds of people.
Craig Kielburger co-founded, with his brother Marc, Free The Children in 1995 at only 12 years of 
age. Today, he remains a passionate full-time volunteer for the organization, now an international 
charity and renowned educational partner that empowers youth to achieve their fullest potential as 
agents of change.
Wendy Mesley is a regular contributor to CBC News: The National, CBC Television’s flagship news 
program, appearing throughout the week in a regular segment that asks provocative questions about 
the news stories Canadians are talking about. She also contributes to CBC News: Marketplace, CBC 
Television's award-winning prime-time investigative consumer show. 
Richard Rosenthal was appointed BC’s first Chief Civilian Director of the Independent Investigations 
Office on January 9, 2012. He has extensive experience in civilian oversight of law enforcement 
having served for 15 years as deputy district attorney for Los Angeles County, where he worked on 
various assignments.
Ian McPherson is a Partner, Advisory Services with KPMG in Toronto and the former Assistant 
Commissioner of Territorial Policing at the Metropolitan Police Service in London, UK. Ian is with 
KPMG's Global Centre of Excellence for Justice and Security, leading its work throughout North 
America.
Major-General (ret'd) Lewis MacKenzie is considered the most experienced peacekeeper on the 
planet. MacKenzie has commanded troops from dozens of countries in some of the world's most 
dangerous places. In Sarajevo, during the Bosnian Civil War, he famously managed to open the 
Sarajevo airport for the delivery of humanitarian aid.
Dr. John Izzo has devoted his life and career to helping leaders create workplaces that bring out the 
best in people, plus discover more purpose and fulfillment in life and work. For over 20 years, he has 
pioneered employee engagement, helping organizations create great corporate cultures and leading 
brands through transformations that create both customer and employee loyalty.
In an increasingly social world, Susan Cain shifts our focus to help us reconsider the role of introverts 
- outlining their many strengths and vital contributions. Like A Whole New Mind and Stumbling on 
Happiness, Cain's book, Quiet: The Power of Introverts In a World That Can't Stop Talking, is a 
paradigm-changing lodestar that shows how dramatically our culture has come to misunderstand and 
undervalue introverts. 
Speakers include
Foundational Courses:
Intelligence Theories and  Applications
Advanced Analytical Techniques
Intelligence Communications
Specialized Courses:
Competitive Intelligence
Analyzing Financial Crimes
Tactical Criminal Intelligence 
Analytical Methodologies for Tactical Criminal 
Intelligence
Entrance Requirements:
Proof of completion of bachelor degree;  OR
A minimum of two years of post secondary 
education plus a minimum of five years
of progressive and specialized experience in 
working with the analysis of data and 
information.  Applicants must also write a 
500 – 1000 word essay on a related topic of 
their choice OR
Applicants who have not completed a 
minimum of 2 years post-secondary 
education must have eight to ten years of 
progressive and specialized experience in 
working with the analysis of data and 
information (Dean/Director discretion).  
Applicants are required to write a 500-1000 
word essay on a related topic of their 
choice.
For detailed requirements please visit the 
JIBC Website.
ONLINE GRADUATE CERTIFICATE PROGRAMS
INTELLIGENCE ANALYSIS | TACTICAL CRIMINAL ANALYSIS
Justice Institute of British Columbia, Canada | www.jibc.ca |graduatestudies@jibc.ca
Foundational Courses
(students enrolled in either graduate certificate are required to complete the 
foundational courses)
Intelligence Theories and Applications
A survey course that introduces the student 
to the discipline of intelligence and provides 
the student with an understanding of how 
intelligence systems function, how they fit 
within the policymaking systems of free 
societies, and how they are managed and 
controlled. The course will integrate 
intelligence theory with the methodology 
and processes that evolved over time to 
assist the intelligence professional. The 
course will develop in the student a range 
of advanced research and thinking skills 
fundamental to the intelligence analysis 
process.
Intelligence Communications
The skill most appreciated by 
the intelligence consumer is the 
ability to communicate, briefly 
and effectively, the results of 
detailed analytic work. This 
course, through repetitive 
application of a focused set of 
skills to a body of information of 
constantly increasing 
complexity, is designed to 
prepare intelligence analysts to 
deliver a variety of intelligence 
products in both written and oral 
formats.
Advanced Analytical Techniques
Topics include: drug/terrorism/other 
intelligence issues, advanced 
analytic techniques (including 
strategic analysis, predicative 
intelligence etc.), collection 
management, intelligence sources, 
management theory (large 
organizations), attacking criminal 
organizations, crisis management, 
negotiation techniques, strategic 
planning, local/regional updates 
and briefing techniques.
Specialized Courses
(students enrolled in either graduate certificate are required to complete the 
foundational courses)
Intelligence Analysis Tactical Criminal Analysis
Competitive Intelligence 
This course explores the business processes involved in 
providing foreknowledge of the competitive environment; the 
prelude to action and decision. The course focuses on 
supporting decisions with predictive insights derived from 
intelligence gathering practices and methodologies used in the 
private sector. Lectures, discussions, and projects focus on the 
desires and expectations of business decision-makers to gain 
first-mover advantage and act more quickly than the 
competition.
Analyzing Financial Crimes
This course examines the nature and scope of financial crimes 
and many of the tools used by law enforcement in the 
preparation of a financial case. Included in this course is a 
detailed treatment of the following: laws which serve to aid in 
the detection and prosecution of these crimes, the types of 
business records available, types of bank records available, an 
examination of offshore business and banking operations, and 
the collection and analysis of this information, with emphasis 
placed on Net Worth and Expenditure Analysis. In addition, 
special treatment is given to the detection and prosecution of 
money laundering, various types of money laundering 
schemes, and the relationship of money laundering to 
terrorism.
Tactical Criminal Intelligence
This course is an introduction to law enforcement 
terminology, practices, concepts, analysis, and 
intelligence. The course will introduce the student to 
the discipline of crime analysis and law enforcement 
intelligence through the study of the intelligence 
cycle and the intelligence determinants. The role and 
responsibilities of an analyst within each sub-topic 
will be addressed. Additionally, the utilization of 
analytical software will be introduced.
Analytical Methodologies for Tactical Criminal 
Intelligence 
The course reviews the key requirements for 
intelligence in law enforcement and homeland 
security. The course focuses the use of advanced 
analytic methodologies to analyze structured and 
unstructured law enforcement data produced by all 
source collection. Students will apply these 
concepts, using a variety of tools, to develop 
descriptive, explanatory, and estimative products 
and briefings for decision-makers in the field.
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DNA CANVASS ‘A PERMISSIBLE 
INVESTIGATIVE PROCESS’
R. v. Osmond, 2012 BCCA 382
 
Following  the discovery of a 13-year-
old girl’s badly injured and partially 
unclothed body in a bushy area near 
her home, police canvassed young 
male persons in the community to 
obtain DNA samples. The girl had been beaten, 
strangled, raped and died as a result of multiple 
injuries. During  the accused’s second interview an 
investigator explained that he wished to take a 
consent sample of blood from him for the purposes 
of DNA analysis in order to narrow the group of 
potential suspects. The investigator explained to the 
accused that the lab would analyze and profile his 
DNA and compare it to any suspect DNA on the 
victim’s body. He explained that if the DNA 
matched, the accused would be charged with 
murder. The accused said he understood and a 
“Biological Evidence Consent Form” was reviewed.  
In reviewing  the form, the accused was told that he 
was being  investigated for murder and he could 
speak with a lawyer. But he chose not to call one. 
He also confirmed that he fully understood he was 
under no obligation to provide a DNA sample, if the 
sample matched he would be arrested and charged 
with murder, the results could be used in court and 
he was voluntarily giving  a sample. He again 
confirmed that he did not want to talk to a lawyer.
British Columbia Supreme Court
The trial judge concluded that the 
accused had not been detained under s. 
10(b) of the Charter and therefore the 
police did not need to advise him of his 
right to counsel. In any event, however, the accused 
was sufficiently advised about his right to counsel. 
Furthermore, the judge ruled that the accused’s 
consent to the seizing  of his blood sample was fully 
informed. He understood: (1) why police took a 
blood sample (to try and match it to any substance 
found on the victim’s body) (2) the uniqueness of 
DNA and how it could implicate a suspect, (3) that if 
his DNA matched he would be charged with murder 
and it could be used in court, (4) he was giving  the 
sample voluntarily and (5) that he could speak to a 
lawyer at no charge if he wished to do so. The judge 
also rejected the accused’s notion that random 
police requests from large samples of non-suspects 
in the community (described as “mass virtue 
testing”) was an unacceptable intrusion of privacy 
regardless of consent. The judge found the taking  of 
the DNA sample did not infringe on the accused’s 
right to be presumed innocent when police did not 
have grounds to get a DNA warrant. The judge 
concluded that the manner in which the DNA 
canvass was conducted did not offend the Charter 
and the DNA evidence was admitted. It linked the 
accused to semen found with the victim’s blood on a 
mattress and material extracted from a wash of the 
victim’s fingernail clippings. He was convicted of 
first degree murder - the killing  occurred 
concurrently with a sexual assault.
British Columbia Court of Appeal
The accused appealed submitting, 
in part, that the DNA evidence 
should have been inadmissible. In 
his view, a general DNA canvass of 
young  male persons in the community for potential 
suspects was an unacceptable practice and violated 
the Charter. He suggested that such police conduct 
was analogous to entrapment -  similar to “random 
virtue testing.” The Court of Appeal, however, 
rejected this view: 
 
Here there was a small community and it 
seemed highly likely that the killer could be a 
resident of the area. The police had a reasoned 
belief that the DNA canvass they proposed 
could lead to the identification of a suspect in 
the homicide. This was a very different case and 
a much more closely focussed investigation. ...  
In my opinion, the DNA canvass by the police 
was a permissible investigative process in the 
circumstances of this case. [para. 22]
 
The accused was neither detained nor placed under 
any improper duress during  the process of obtaining 
his DNA and he voluntarily furnished a sample of 
his blood. The accused’s appeal was dismissed.
Complete case available at www.courts.gov.bc.ca
